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To the Editor:
We wish to provide some rational in defense of the title of this comment. 
If we agree that a dogmatist is one whose 
beliefs cannot be influenced by observa-
tions (i.e., data), and we define learning as 
having your beliefs influenced by observa-
tions, then it follows that dogmatists cannot 
learn. While this statement has been made 
previously,1(p.47)2 we believe it is useful to 
expand on this point with a simple exam-
ple. Indeed, some dangers of dogmatism 
in epidemiology have been documented3, 
and one does not have to look far for trivial 
examples of dogmatic statements.4
First, recall that the standard 
rules of probability theory are con-
vexity, 0 1≤ ( ) ≤P a ; multiplication, 
P a w P a w P w( ) | ( )and = ( ) , where 
P a w( | ) is the probability of arbi-
trary statement a presuming arbi-
trary statement w holds; and addition, 
P a w P a P w P a wor and( ) = ( ) + ( ) − ( ). 
Next, we will need to review a simple 
application of probability theory which 
follows from the above rules,5 and is 
adapted from an example given by 
Lindley.6(p.131) Here, we are using prob-
ability to denote belief, where probabil-
ity 1 is certainty and probability 1/2 is 
equally likely as not. Although we also 
ascribe to probability as chance, and 
strive to follow Lewis’ principal principle 
(i.e., to bring your belief probabilities in 
line with known chance-probabilities).5
Consider the following question: 
XDsWQGFCVDsUDZQVOQDQU-
YLLeMX? to make things interesting, 
this question is encrypted in a language 
we do not understand. For the purposes 
of this exercise, say we know that the 
possible answers to this question are 1/3 
or 2/3. We will let θ  denote this discrete 
parameter space, such that θ = 1 3/  or 
θ = 2 3/ . We can extend to a continuous
parameter space, but we wish to keep 
this example simple enough to tabulate.
Before we see any data, n = 0
, we might have no knowledge about 
the relative probability of the two pos-
sible values of θ. to translate this igno-
rance into a prior probability, we employ 
Laplace’s rule of succession,7(p.19) 
P y n= + +( ) / ( )1 2 , and assign prob-
ability 1/2 to each possible value of the 
statement. this means we have prior prob-
ability P Pθ θ=( ) = =( ) =1 3 2 3 1 2/ / /
. to learn, we might gather observations 
or information. As an aside, information 
seems necessary but is not sufficient for 
learning. In addition to information, we 
require a system or engine to translate 
the information into knowledge. Here, 
in a setting where we wish to learn about 
the factual natural course (i.e., what is), 
we use probability logic as our engine.8 In 
more complex settings where we wish to 
learn about what might be we use a coun-
terfactual probability logic as our engine.9 
Information coupled with our engine and 
identification conditions appears suffi-
cient for learning, but is not necessary (as 
other engines or conditions exist).
say we find 12 people who can 
decrypt or translate this question and 
report to us whether they believe that 
θ = 1 3/  or θ = 2 3/ . For simplicity, we
will consider these 12 people indepen-
dent and exchangeable10 (or permut-
able11) with respect to their decryption
abilities. Also, we will ignore the cer-
tainty with which their reports are pro-
vided. say the reports are 7 of 12 in favor 
of θ = 2 3/ . recall that Bayes’ rule is
P w a P a w P w P a| |( ) = ( ) ( ) / ( ). In our set-
ting, this is P y P y P P yθ θ θ| |( ) = ( ) ( ) / ( ),
where y  is shorthand for the observed 
data y n/  and P y|θ( ) is the likelihood.12
In our setting, the likelihood is bino-
mial, or P y
n
y




−( ) −1 . 
Details of calculations are shown in the 
upper panel of the table. Our posterior 
probability that θ = 2 3/  is 0.8, much 
increased from our prior probability 
that θ = 2 3/ , which was 0.5.
Now we are prepared to demon-
strate that dogmatists cannot learn. say 
our prior probabilities are as given in the 
lower panel of the table. this dogmatic 
prior probability completely rules out 
the option θ = 2 3/ . the data and resul-
tant likelihood are unchanged from the 
upper panel of the table. regardless of 
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P y |θ( )a
P y P|θ θ( ) ( ) Posterior Probability 
P yθ |( )b
1/3 0.5 0.04769 0.02385 0.2
2/3 0.5 0.19076 0.09538 0.8






P y |θ( )a
P y P|θ θ( ) ( ) Posterior Probability 
P yθ |( )b
1/3 1.0 0.04769 0.04769 1.0
2/3 0.0 0.19076 0.0 0.0





y n y| θ θ θ( ) 

 ( )= −
−
1 .
bP y P y P P yθ θ θ| | /( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= .
c
P y P y P( ) ( ) ( )= ∑ | θ θθ .
targeted prevention and early detection 
strategies.5,6
In this study, we further assessed 
the feasibility of targeted screening 
based on a risk prediction model using 
the Lorenz Curve. the Lorenz Curve is 
a graphical tool widely used in econo-
metrics to characterizing the distribution 
of wealth in the society, which has been 
suggested to be valuable in demonstrat-
ing the “concentration” of disease risks.7 
this tool may be particularly relevant 
when evaluating screening programs in 
the context of disease risk prediction.
We have developed a risk predic-
tion model based on data from a nation-
wide population-based case–control 
study in sweden in 1995–1997.2,5 Par-
ticipants included 189 histologically 
confirmed incident cases of esophageal 
adenocarcinoma from all relevant hos-
pital departments in sweden, and 820 
control subjects frequency-matched for 
age and sex and randomly selected from 
the swedish population. Detailed infor-
mation on risk factors was collected 
via face-to-face interviews. this study 
was approved by all six regional ethi-
cal review boards in sweden, and both 
written and oral informed consent was 
obtained from each participant. In brief, 
we ranked the estimated risks for all con-
trols (representing the population at risk) 
obtained from the logistic regression 
model. For each of the risk levels, the 
cumulative proportions of controls and 
estimated risks having this level of risk 
or below were used to draw the curve. 
Methodological details can be found in 
the report by Mauguen and Begg.7
the constructed Lorenz Curve 
is shown in Figure. Based on a simple 
model, which only included information 
on reflux symptoms or use of antire-
flux medication, body mass index, and 
tobacco smoking, 37% of all esophageal 
adenocarcinoma cases would occur in 
the 10% of the population with the high-
est risks, and 22% of all cases would 
be identifiable from the top 5% of the 
population based on risk. the estimated 
risks would be even more concentrated 
after also considering age and sex. For 







the data, here the dogmatists’ posterior 
equals their prior. therefore, dogmatists 
cannot learn. Of course, this prior state-
ment (and the title of this comment) is 
itself dogmatic, although we encour-
age dissent.2,13 Finally, we are usually 
dogmatic regarding options we do not 
foresee. A point of this comment is to 
prepare ourselves to be open to alter-
natives as they present themselves. As 
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To the Editor:
The incidence of esophageal adenocar-cinoma has been rapidly increasing in 
the Western societies in recent decades.1 
Gastroesophageal reflux disease, obesity, 
and tobacco smoking are the major risk 
factors.1,2 esophageal adenocarcinoma is 
characterized by a poor prognosis with an 
overall 5-year survival below 15%–20%, 
which is even worse in patients diag-
nosed at late stages.1 Upper endoscopy is 
increasingly utilized for detection of the 
premalignant condition of esophageal 
adenocarcinoma, that is, Barrett’s esoph-
agus with dysplasia. However, a univer-
sal screening strategy, even in patients 
with reflux, is unfeasible given the con-
siderable costs and risk of complications, 
and the low incidence (0.7 per 100,000 
person-years globally, and the highest, 7 
per 100,000 years in men in the United 
Kingdom).3,4 risk prediction models for 
esophageal adenocarcinoma combining 
information on risk factors have recently 
been developed. these have had good 
discriminative accuracy and have shown 
promising potential in identifying high-
risk individuals who might benefit from 
